The article is devoted to a critical analysis of the neorepublican concept of freedom as non-domination, developed by Philip Pettit, within the context of the famous dichotomy of positive and negative liberty proposed by Isaiah Berlin. The relevance of the study is determined by the ongoing debate in political philosophy regarding the definition of freedom and the claims of neorepublicanism to overcome the Berlinian classification. The work sequentially reconstructs the positions of Berlin, Skinner, and Pettit, identifying the latter's key arguments in favor of freedom as the absence of arbitrary interference (non-domination). The main focus is on a critical examination of this concept: its internal contradictions are analyzed, such as the thesis of the possibility of "domination without active interference," the conflation of freedom with security, and the presence of unacknowledged positive elements within it. It is argued that, contrary to the statements of the neorepublicans, their ideal does not represent a third, independent concept but is a synthesis of elements of the Berlinian dichotomy. In conclusion, the author asserts that while the criticism from Berlin has been fruitful for the development of the discourse, Pettit's proposed alternative is not without serious shortcomings and cannot be considered unequivocally superior to the Berlinian approach.
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